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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
began granting business method and computer software patents.
Eventually, different tests for patentability of this new class of patents
sprung out of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and
the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS). 2 These differences
were eventually addressed on October 30, 2008 in the landmark In re
Bilski decision.3 In Bilski, the CAFC reiterated that the machine-or* J.D., cum laude, 2009, University of Florida Levin College of Law; M.S., 2006,
University of Central Florida; B.S., 2004, University of Central Florida. The author wishes to
thank Professor Richard S. Vermut for his guidance and advice. His seminar at the University of
Florida Levin College of Law was the inspiration for this Note. Additionally, the author would
like to thank his family for their unwavering support. This Note is dedicated to the memory of
Clifford P. Ocksrider and Jeffrey S. Kosh.
1. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed.
Cff. 1992); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
2. For example, in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature FinancialGroup,Inc., 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the CAFC utilized the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test. Id.
at 1373. However, in Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), the SCOTUS used the machineor-transformation test. Id. at 70.
3. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
179
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transformation test was still the law of the land and that the decision in
State Street Bank was no longer valid law.4
The machine-or-transformation test is a patent eligibility test specific
to process patents. 5 In order to qualify as patentable subject matter
under the machine-or-transformation test, a process must either be
implemented on a particular machine, or make some form of
transformation on an article, bringing it from one state to another. 6 The
Bilski decision was specific to a business method patent, but has since
led to repercussions throughout the software industry. Additionally, in
Ex parte Langemyr8 and Ex parte Wasynczuk 9 the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) further limited the applicability of the
machine-or-transformation test by holding
a general-purpose computer
0
does not qualify as a specific machine.'
The result of these decisions leaves the patent portfolios of numerous
companies at risk, many of which are considered cutting edge and
incredibly innovative." Google, for instance, has developed some of the
most innovative search technology in use today. 12 New restrictions on
computer software patents might destroy their portfolio and entire
business model.1 3 But still, the Bilski decision and its progeny make it
clear that a change is necessary. The problem is, all Bilski did was
14
overrule the State Street decision and the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.
New guidance is necessary to answer the numerous questions regarding
patentable subject matter.
It is clear that these former tests have not worked. 5 Patents have
been issued for inventions that merely took known steps and translated
4. Id. at 959-60.
5. Id. at 961-62.

6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Wayne F. Reinke, Commentary, Software and Business Method Patents
Called Into Question, DAILY REc. (Rochester, N.Y.), Jan. 20, 2009, available at http://www.
hrfnlaw.com/img/articles/article_495719.pdf.
8. Ex parte Langemyr, Appeal No. 2008-1495 (May 28, 2008), http://www.uspto.gov/

web/offices/dcomfbpai/its/fd081495.pdf. Even though these cases were handed down before the
actual Bilski decision was issued, they came after oral arguments and after an indication was
given as to the direction the PTO was headed. Thus, these cases not only buttressed the Bilski
decision, but they also further limited the scope of patentable subject matter.
9. Ex parte Wasynczuk, Appeal No. 2008-1496 (June 2, 2008), http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd081496.pdf.
10. John F. Duffy, The Death of Google's Patents,PATENTLY-O, July 21, 2008, available
at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/googlepatents 101 .pdf.
11. See id. at l.
12. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999B1 (filed Jan. 9, 1998).
13. Duffy, supranote 10, at 2.
14. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
15. This is best evidenced by the various tests that have come forward throughout the last
three decades. See E. Robert Youches & Sherry X. Wu, The Future of Software Patents After
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them for use on a computer.' 6 The first part of this Note examines the
history of the various tests of patentability for business methods and
computer software. Next, this Note examines the Bilski opinion and its
progeny and how these opinions affect patentability of computer
software and business methods. This Note will then compare the Bilski
opinion with prior CAFC and SCOTUS precedent to highlight the
changes Bilski caused. The last part of this Note introduces a new test of
patentability for computer software and business methods. This test
alleviates the shortcomings associated with the previous tests, which are
made readily apparent by Bilski.
II. BACKGROUND

To truly understand the ramifications of Bilski and its ilk, one must
understand what exactly a computer software or business method patent
is and the requirements necessary to receive one. Statutory limits on
patentable subject matter are defined and controlled by title 35, section
101 of the U.S. Code. 17 Section 101 makes it clear that "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter"
deserves patent protection. 18 The SCOTUS has identified several areas
that do not deserve a grant of monopoly through patent protection. 19
These include abstract concepts, naturally occurring phenomena, and
laws of nature. 20 But, generally, the SCOTUS and Congress have made
it clear that subject matter, as a threshold question, 2 1 is expansive. 2 2 So,
how did computer programs and so-called business methods move their
way into the ambit of the patent system? The answer to this question
lies at the beginning.

Bilski, 65, 69, P.L.I. COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK

SERIES (Mar. 2009).
16. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,607,389 (filed Dec. 3, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 3,418,999
(filed Feb. 12, 1964); U.S. Patent No. 6,735,568 (filed Aug. 10, 2000).

17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Of course, an application is
still subject to sections 102, 103, and 112 as hurdles to patentability. Some have argued that
these sections are far better suited to determining patentability and that rather than have PTO
examiners make philosophical decisions about statutory subject matter, rejections should issue
under these three sections instead. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 992 (Newman, J.,
dissenting); Brief of Amicus Curiae of Twenty-two Law and Business Professors in Support of
Appellants at 21, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008) (No. 2007-1130).
22. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)).
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In aiding creation of the U.S. patent
laws,
23 the Founding Fathers were
heavily influenced by the Enlightenment. This view was marked by
the idea that technology was used to dominate nature. 24 The goal was
25
the production of "practical outcomes" through the use of technology.
This view was embraced by the Founding Fathers as evidenced by the
Patent Clause, which has been repeated ad nauseam by courts and
commentators, that Congress was empowered to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries. 26 The goal,
of course, was to elevate human achievement. 27 All prior Patent Acts up
until the 1952 revision 28 merged subject matter with the other
requirements for patentability. 29 Even the major patent treatise of the
time listed only novelty, utility, embodiment,
and enablement as the
30
only major requirements for patentability.
Eventually, tests to determine the boundaries of statutory subject
matter emerged. Justice Joseph Story espoused the first of these
boundaries as the moral utility doctrine. 3 1 Justice Story encouraged the
consideration of social and moral values when attempting to determine
patentability of an invention. 32 An invention must have some beneficial
societal use in order to obtain patent protection. 33 Additional judicial
exceptions included natural laws or phenomena and "un-embodied
innovations that remained within an inventor's mind., 34 In other words,
those things in their natural state and not reduced to human control were
not patentable. 35 Thus, the concept of subject matter boundaries has
been wrestled with for centuries.
23. Dana Irwin, ParadiseLost in the Patent Law, 60 FLA. L. REv. 775, 781 (2008).
24. See id. at 783; see also I. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum § 129 (1620), reprintedin
I The Works of Francis Bacon at 370-71 (Basil Montagu ed., Phila., Carey & Hart 1848).
25. See Irwin, supra note 23, at 783.
26. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.

27. Irwin, supra,note 23, at 785.
28. Barring several amendments since 1952, this Act remains closest to the basic structure
we have today. See id. at 786.
29. Id.

30. The primary treatise of the time was written by George Curtis. Patentability was
presented in a unified theory that stated an invention was made of patentable subject matter no
matter what "category" it fell into as long as it was correctly described, and it appears to be
novel and useful, and unites all the other requisites of the statute. See Irwin, supra note 23, at
787.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 789.

35. Id. This concept was derived from the common law property principle that in order to
obtain title to land, possession was required. Those who had not reduced something to
possession could obtain no legal protection. This concept of the "rule of capture" is best
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In 1952, the Patent Act was overhauled and each requirement of
patentability was segmented into individual sections. 36 The Act's
creator, Judge Giles Rich, explained that this segmentation meant that
each requirement was like "separate doors to be opened in succession
by separate keys. 3 7 He went on to state that the first door to be opened
was that of subject matter and that this particular door should be
"relatively easy to open." 38 Ultimately, "subject matter creep"
eventually led to computer software
39 and business methods to come into
the umbrella of patent protection.
The natural starting point for any discussion regarding statutory
subject matter of computer software and business methods is the
seminal case of Gottschalk v. Benson. 40 Decided in 1972, the Court held
that a patent claim wholly directed to a mathematical algorithm did not
constitute a process under section 101 because allowing a patent to issue
would essentially grant a monopoly on the algorithm itself.4 1 The
government advanced the theory that no process claim could issue
unless directed toward a particular machine or unless a transformation
43
42
of substances occurred. This theory was again advanced in Bilski.

illustrated in the classic case of Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805). See also John
William Nelson, Fiber Optic Foxes: Virtual Objects and Virtual Worlds Through the Lens of
Pierson v. Post and the Law of Capture, 14 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 5 (2009). A more recent
example comes from the Academy Award winning movie "There Will Be Blood" wherein the
main character, Daniel Plainview, is confronted by a neighboring landowner regarding a lease.
The landowner and Plainview have an exchange that sums up the law of capture nicely:
Eli Sunday: If you would just take this lease, Daniel ...
Plainview: Drainage! Drainage, Eli, my boy. Drained dry. I'm so sorry.
Here, if you have a milkshake, and I have a milkshake, and I have a straw.
There it is, that's a straw, you see? You watching?. And my straw reaches
acroooooooss the room, and starts to drink your milkshake... I... drink
...your... milkshake!
[sucking sound]
Plainview: I drink it up!
THERE WILL BE BLOOD (Ghoulardi Film Company 2007).

36. Irwin, supra note 23, at 807.
37. Id. at 806.
38. Id.
39. The term 'subject matter creep' is only used to succinctly define the situation where
advances in technology lead to the emergence of completely new areas of technology, for
instance, computers. When the Founding Fathers contemplated patentable subject matter, it is
highly doubtful they contemplated a silicon chip, integrated circuits, and disk platters. It in no
way speaks to the patentability of the technology.
40. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
41. Id. at 72.
42. Id. at 70.
43. See infra Part IV.
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The invention at issue in Benson involved a "method of converting
signals from binary coded decimal form into binary."" The claims were
not limited to a specific machine and covered the use of the method in
any general-purpose computer. 45 The claims could also be performed
without the use of a computer, but through the use of a chart or
mentally.46 The claims were rejected by the Patent Office.4 7 The
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed the
rejection. 4488 The CCPA indicated that because the rejection was based on
44. Benson, 409 U.S. at 73. Claims 8 and 13 were both disputed and read as follows:
Claim 8 reads:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into
binary which comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is a
binary "1" in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary "1" in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary "1" to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a "1" to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation
for a succeeding binary "1" in the second position of said register.
Claim 13 reads:
A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal number
representations into binary number representations comprising the steps of
(1)testing each binary digit position "1," beginning with the least significant
binary digit position, of the most significant decimal digit representation for
a binary "0" or a binary "1";
(2) if a binary "0" is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least significant
binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(3) if a binary "1" is detected, adding a binary "1" at the (i l)th and (i 3) th
least significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant decimal
digit representation, and repeating step (1) for the next least significant
binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant
decimal digit representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the next
lesser significant decimal digit representation as modified by the previous
execution of steps (1) through (3); and
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least significant decimal
digit representation has been so processed.
Id.at 73-74.
45. Id.at 64.
46. Id.at 67.
47. Id.at 64.
48. Application of Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971). The CCPA oversaw appeals
from the Patent Office up until the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 by the Federal Circuit
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section 101 and the invention was directed toward statutory subject
matter, the rejected was overruled.4 9 The CCPA and the briefs from
each party pointed to section 112 as a more proper means for rejection,
though it was not asserted as the reason for rejection at the Patent
Office. °
The question for SCOTUS was whether the described method was a
'process' within the meaning of section 101 of the Patent Act."1 The
Court held the method to be "so abstract and sweeping as to cover both
known and unknown uses" of the method.5 2 In effect, allowing a patent
such as the one in Benson to issue would be akin to allowing a patent on
an idea. 53 The Court reasoned that "[t]ransformation and reduction of an
article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a
process claim that does not include particular machines." 5 4 However,
the Court qualified the above language by also stating that it did not
mean "no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the
requirements" of either being tied to a particular machine or apparatus
or transforming an article from one state to another.5" The Court
addressed the policy implications of Benson and the uncertainty of6
whether the result foreclosed patentability of computer programs.5
Ultimately, the Court determined whether
computer programs were
5 7
Congess.
for
left
best
was
patentable
But Congress did not act, 8 and so, six years later, the Court
addressed a similar situation in the case of Parker v. Flook.5 9 The
invention in Flook was directed toward a method for calculating and
updating alarm limits during the catalytic conversion process. 60 As in
Benson, the method in Flook was essentially a mathematical
62
algorithm. 6 1 The algorithm was independent of any specific machine.
Act of 1982. See An Act to establish a United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to
establish a United States Claims Court, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
49. Application of Benson, 441 F.2d at 688.
50. Id. at 686.
51. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
52. Id.at 68.
53. Id. at 71-72.
54. Id. at 70.
55. Id. at 71. This language indicates that the so-called "machine or transformation test"
was never intended to be the exclusive test used to determine whether a method was a 'process'
under section 101 of the Patent Act.
56. Id.at 72.
57. Id. at 73.
58. Some have surmised that this inaction led us down the path of subject matter
uncertainty we are on today. See Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents, 25 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191, 199 (2008-09).

59. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
60. Id. at 585.
61. Id.
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Once again, the claim was rejected by the Patent Office on the basis that
a patent on the method "'would in practical effect be a patent on the
formula or mathematics itself.' 63 The rejection was sustained by the
BPAI where it was determined that the novelty in the invention was the
algorithm itself and as such, was not patentable under Benson.64 The
CCPA reversed the BPAI decision because the use of the65algorithm in
the invention did not wholly pre-empt the algorithm itself.
Again, the SCOTUS had an opportunity to interpret the meaning of
the term 'process' under section 101 of the Patent Act. The Court
reasoned that "[p]henomena of nature . . . mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic
tools of scientific and technological work., 6 6 The Court noted that the
process in question did not wholly pre-empt the mathematical algorithm
it utilized. 6 ' But, the Court stated that "post-solution activit" could not
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable one. This meant
that some inventive step or application, termed a point of novelty, was
necessary in order to create patentability. 69 Even though the initial
rejection came under section 101, the Court reasoned that because the
method at issue was well known in the prior art, the claim as a whole
was not statutory subject matter.7 ° Unfortunately, the Court in Flook did
not clarify whether the machine-or-transformation test controlled, or
whether a new test combining a novelty, non-obviousness, and proper
statutory subject matter controlled. 7 '
In 1980, the SCOTUS had an additional chance to comment on
patentable subject matter in the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.72 The
invention involved was not a computer software process, but concerned
73
a live, human-made, bacterium designed to break down crude oil.
62. Id. at 586.
63. Id. at 587.
64. Id.
65. Id. The CCPA read Benson to mean that only those algorithms that wholly pre-empt
the use of the algorithm could not issue. Id.

66. Id. at 589 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 590. The notion of taking a principle and performing some form of post-solution
activity is more a question of obviousness or novelty than it is a question of whether it is
patentable subject matter. See Thomas, supra note 58, at 199. However, this statement has been
consistently applied, including in the realm of computer software where it has been held that
"[tihe routine addition of modem electronics to an otherwise unpatentable invention typically
creates a prima facie case of obviousness." In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
69. Flook,437 U.S. 584 at 594.
70. Id. at 594-95.
71. Thomas, supra note 58, at 199.
72. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
73. Id. at 305.
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Despite not disclosing a computer program, Chakrabarty had serious
ramifications in the treatment of computer software patents.74 The
Patent Office rejected the claims on the basis that they disclosed a living
organism and, as such, were a product of nature and that living things
were not statutory subject matter. 75 The BPAI affirmed the rejection on
the grounds that living things do not constitute statutory subject
matter.76 The BPAI acknowledged that the specific bacterium disclosed
in the application was not a product of nature, as it was not naturally
occurring in the form disclosed.77 The CCPA reversed, vacated, and
consolidated the case with In re Bergy7 8 for reconsideration and
reaffirmed its earlier judgments. 79 The SCOTUS granted certiorari.80
The Court again had to determine a question of the boundaries of
section 101 of the Patent Act. Chakrabarty is important in the context of
computer software or business method patents because of the famous
phrase that "Congress intended statutory subject matter to include
anything under the sun that is made by man." 8 The Court interpreted
this intent to mean that patent laws "would be given wide scope" and,
that the claims described patentable subject matter.82 Additionally, the
Court indicated that if Congress
wished to narrow the scope of section
83
so.
do
to
free
was
it
101,
The genesis of the expansion of patentable subject matter into the
realm of computer software process patents was the case of Diamond v.
Diehr handed down just a year after the Chakrabarty decision.8 4 The
claim at issue in Diehr disclosed an algorithm for curing rubber. The
claim at issue constantly measured the inside of a mold, sending these
measurements to a computer that constantly updated the cure time and
sent a signal to open the mold upon completion of the process.8 5 The
claim was rejected at the Patent Office and affirmed by the BPAI on the
grounds that the claims did not constitute statutory subject matter.8 6 The
74. Thomas, supra note 58, at 201.
75. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 306.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See generally In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).

79. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306.
80. Id at 307.
81. Id.at 308, 309. Many feel this phrase has been taken out of context to misconstrue
section 101 as having a low threshold. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 58, at 201-02. This is
inconsistent with stated congressional intent. See S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP.
No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
82. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 308-09.
83. Id.at318.
84. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
85. Id.at 178-79.
86. Id. at 179-81.
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CCPA reversed, holding that otherwise statutory subject matter "does
not become nonstatutory because a computer is involved., 87 The claims
themselves were not directed solely to a mathematical algorithm, but to
a process that solved a practical problem. 8
The SCOTUS was presented with the question of whether the CCPA
decision was inconsistent with precedent.8 The Court upheld the CCPA
decision that an otherwise statutory claim does not "become
nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer
program, or digital computer." 90 A novel structure created with the aid
of science is statutory subject matter. 9' Again, the Court reiterated that a
physical transformation and "reduction of an article 'to a different state
or thing' is the clue to patentability." 92 Additionally, the Court withdrew
from Flook's point of novelty requirement holding that when
determining statutory subject matter the claims "must be considered as 93
a
whole" rather than dissecting the claims into new and old elements.
Furthermore, the novelty of any process step has "no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls" within section
101.94
After Diehr, the SCOTUS did not take another software patentability
case. 95 Instead, the CAFC 9 6 began shaping the boundaries of section
101 and computer programs and business methods. 97 Beginning with
Arrhythmia Research v. Corazonix, the CAFC expanded the reach of
statutory subject matter. 99 In Arrhythmia, the patent in question
involved a process used to identify the potentiality for ventricular
tachycardia in heart attack patients. 0 The process monitored heart
activity through the use of an electrocardiograph device (EKG) and
electrodes attached to the patient.' 0 ' The EKG displayed a waveform
version of the output and additionally piped the output digitally to a

87. Id. at 181.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id.at 187.
91. Id. Again, the Court uses novelty and usefulness to describe statutory subject matter
when it should be a different inquiry.
92. Id. at 184 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70).
93. Id. at 188.
94. Id. at 188-89.
95. Thomas, supra note 58, at 202.
96. The CAFC was created in 1982 to replace the CCPA. Thomas, supra note 58, at 203.
97. Id.
98. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
99. In some views, this is when the CAFC began its split with the SCOTUS precedent on
computer software patent subject matter eligibility. See Thomas, supranote 58, at 203.
100. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1054.
101.

Id.
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computer for analysis. 10 2 The output produced by the computer alerted
physicians as03 to whether the patient was at risk for ventricular
tachycardia. 1
The PTO granted the patent without questioning whether the claims
were directed to statutory subject matter. 10 4 The CAFC used the
Freeman-Walter-Abele framework to determine whether the instant
claims disclosed patentable subject matter.10 5 The Freeman-WalterAbele test first makes the determination of whether the claim recites a
mathematical algorithm either directly or indirectly.' 0 6 If so, the next
step is determining whether the claimed invention "as a whole is no
more than the algorithm itself.' 1 7 In the context of the Freeman-WalterAbele test, this means a determination of whether the algorithm is
applied to physical elements or process steps. 108 If not, statutory subject
matter is disclosed. 10 9 If the algorithm is simply applied to a process or
apparatus, the invention describes statutory subject matter. 110 The
Freeman-Walter-Abele test did not require a particular machine, instead
focusing on what "the claimed method steps do" instead of how "the
steps are performed.""'
The invention in Arrhythmia would fail the machine-ortransformation test because nothing was transformed. 1 2 Additionally,
the invention disclosed little more in the way of a particular machine
than the invention in Flook did." l 3 Yet, the CAFC concluded that there
was indeed a physical transformation when the EKG read electrical
heart signals and converted them to digital signals. 1 14 Additionally, the
analysis performed by the computer transformed the EKG signal into a
different state. 115 Therefore, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test was
satisfied 6and the CAFC held that the patent described statutory subject
matter. 11
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. Id. at 1055. The instant claims were under scrutiny because both parties were
embroiled in litigation. Id. at 1054. Summary judgment was granted for Corazonix because the
district court held the invention in question, U.S. Patent No. 4,422,459, did not state statutory
subject matter. Id.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.

112. Thomas, supra note 58, at 204.
113. Id.
114. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1059.
115. Id.

116. Id. at 1060-61.
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Perhaps the most well known departure the CAFC made from
SCOTUS precedent appeared in the case of State Street Bank & Trust v.
Signature Financial Group. 1 7 Prior to 1996, business method patents
were traditionally seen as an exception to section 101 of the Patent
Act." 8 In 1996, the PTO issued guidelines on how to determine and
evaluate the patentability of inventions involving a computer."19 The
guidelines stated that claims directed to methods of doing business
should be "treated like any other process claims." 120 This does not mean
a tacit acceptance of patents on business methods, but rather, it means
applications involving a method of doing business should be viewed in
light of traditional process claims. 12 1 No matter whether the PTO
attempted to narrow the application of business method patents in 1996,
the CAFC issued the State Street decision in 1998.
In State Street, the patent in question, U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056
('056 patent), described an investment structure called a "Hub and
Spoke" system whereby "mutual funds (Spokes) pool their assets in an
investment portfolio (Hub) organized as a partnership."' 22 The district
court found that the '056 patent was invalid on the grounds that it did
not claim statutory subject matter. 123 On appeal, the CAFC explicitly
indicated that there was no longer any such thing as a business method
exception. 124 The CAFC held that business methods were subject to the
same rigors and legal requirements required for patentability of any
other process.125 Additionally, the CAFC held that a machine was
"proper statutory subject matter" under section 101.126
The CAFC relied upon the term "any" in section 101 in not placing
any restrictions on subject matter beyond those specifically annunciated
by Congress.127 The CAFC buttressed its determination by utilizing the
language from Chakrabarty that "anything under the sun that is made by
man ' ' 28 is patentable. 129- Those things specifically excluded from
117. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
118. Alexandra Wilson, Business Method Patents Gone Wild: NarrowingState Street Bank
and Shifting to a EuropeanPerspective, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 71, 79 (2007).
119. See id. (citing Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478, 7479 (Feb.28, 1996)).
120. Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479
(Feb. 28, 1996).
121. Wilson, supranote 118, at 79.
122. State St., 149 F.3d at 1370.
123. Id.
124. Id.at 1375.
125. Id.
126. Id.at 1372.
127. Id.at 1373.
128. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309.
129. State St., 149 F.3d at 1373.
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statutory subject matter are "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas."' 30 In order for a mathematical algorithm to survive, it
must be applied in some useful way.' 3 1 Accordingly,
this is where the
12
useful, concrete, and tangible result test came from.
The CAFC also indicated that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test had
little applicability in determining statutory subject matter after Diehr
and Chakrabarty. 133 Ultimately, the CAFC stated that a process is a
process,
regardless of whether it "does "business" instead of something
134
else.

,

So it went until 2006 where it seemed the SCOTUS had given tacit
acceptance to what was occurring in the field of statutory subject matter
of patents. Then, on June 22, 2006, the SCOTUS dismissed certiorari in
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories. 135 Justice Breyer along with Justices Stevens and Souter
dissented from the dismissal on the grounds that the patent in question
claimed nothing more than a principle of nature. 36 The invention
involved a diagnostic test that correlated test results and potential
vitamin deficiencies. 137 In this instance the parties agreed and the
inventors testified at trial that the method covered any test that
determined whether body fluid has an "elevated level of total
homocysteine" and a physician "recognizing that a test that shows an
elevated homocysteine level."' 138 However, the "natural relationship
between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency was now well known" so
that this correlation would
"occur automatically in the mind of any
139
physician."'
competent
The CAFC rejected the idea that the patent was a monopoly over a
scientific fact. 140 Instead, the CAFC concluded that because a competent
physician would automatically perform the method, virtually every
doctor would qualify as a direct infringer. 141 The SCOTUS concluded
that this was a patent on a law of nature regardless of how narrowly the
concept of "principle of nature" was construed. 142 The respondents
argued that simply because the method involved a law of nature, did not
130. Id.
131.

Id.

132. Youches & Wu, supra note 15, at 69.
133. State St., 149 F.3d at 1374.

134. Id. at 1377.
135. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006).

136. Id. at 135.
137. Id. at 129.
138. Id.

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id. at 135.
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render the method unpatentable. 143 But, the SCOTUS pointed that there
was no physical transformation.' 44 Additionally, the SCOTUS indicated
that it had not approved of any such useful, concrete, or tangible test as
set forth in State Street.145 Even though the dissent was not precedential,
it was clear that the SCOTUS was not happy with the direction of the
CAFC. Thus, Justice Breyer's dissent in Metabolite expressed clear
concern with the direction of the CAFC.
III. STANDARD FOR PATENTABILITY: LIFE BEFORE BILSKI
On its face, process is defined as a "process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known yrocess, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material."' 4 The Patent Act of 1952 replaced
"art" from previous statutes with the term "process."' 147 Legislative
history to the 1952 Act makes it clear that "art" was interpreted to mean
"process" or "method."' 48 This sort of open-ended definition left room
for unknown fields of future
creativity with regard to the scope of
149
section 101 prior to Bilski.
Essentially, there were two standards prior to Bilski. The first began
with a two-step test standard commonly known as the Freeman-WalterAbele test. 150 The first step was to determine whether the claim recited
an algorithm that fell within the meaning of Benson.'5 ' Next, a
determination was made as to the application of the algorithm to
"physical elements or process steps."'152 This test was a split from the
SCOTUS test at the time and represented the CAFC's burgeoning selfindependence
from the SCOTUS, something for which it was much
53
maligned. 1
Additionally, there was the machine or transformation test from
Benson 154 later reaffirmed in Diehr.155 This was a test pronounced by
the SCOTUS. 156 It asks whether a process is tied to a machine or
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 136.
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2009).
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 958-59 (majority opinion).

151. Id.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
See Thomas, supranote 58, at 206-07.
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981).
Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
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whether a physical transformation occurs. 157 If either exists, it is
patentable subject matter. 158 This test arose out of trying to determine
whether a patent application tried to claim a natural process, phenomena
of nature, or abstract concept. 59 An abstract concept is difficult to
define. If something is tied to a particular machine, or if it manipulates
another thing through a physical transformation, than it cannot be an
abstract concept.' 60 But, this is only one mechanism used to determine
whether or not something is abstract.' 6 1 Thus, the "machine or
transformation
test" was not meant to be a catchall test or apply to every
62
1
process.
While having two tests for patentability might not have been ideal, it
was predictable. 63 However, it caused a deluge of patents issued under
the auspice of business methods or computer software.'64 Section 273 of
title 35 was amended to reflect the addition of the business method as
patentable subject matter. 165 Questions existed because of the difference
between the tests in the CAFC and the SCOTUS. 16 6 These questions are
best illustrated through comparison of the claims in Flook and
Arrhythmia. The output of each was simply data, albeit more complex
in the case of Arrhythmia.167 The sole advancement in both cases was
limited to the computer-based components.' 68 Yet, one patent was held
valid, and the other not because it claimed a law of nature.1 69 So, the
climate was rife with conflict as evidenced by the dissent in Metabolite.
Rather than set forth yet another test that differed from the SCOTUS,
the CAFC handed down Bilski.
IV. BILSKI AND ITS ILK

After Metabolite, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) gradually
retreated from its use of the prior useful, concrete, and tangible test.
157. Id.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 71.
Id.

163.

Draftsmen have gamed the system before, and will continually adapt to game any test

that might come forward. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Twenty-two Law and Business
Professors in Support of Appellants at 9-11, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008) (No. 2007-1130).
164. See supra text accompanying note 16. See also Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1004 (Mayer, J.,
dissenting).
165. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (2009).
166. See Youches & Wu, supra note 15, at 67-72.
167. Thomas, supra note 58, at 202-04.

168. Id. at 203.
169. Id. at 204.
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First, in Ex parte Langemyr, the Board of Patent Appeals on
Interferences (BPAI) issued an informative opinion on May 28, 2008.170
The method in Langemyr concerned a computer apparatus used for
creating a physical modeling system through the use of a set of partial
differential equations. 17 1 The claims in question were initially rejected
by the PTO and appealed to the BPAI. 172 There was no physical
73
transformation involved and no physical output to the real world.1
Additionally, "[n]ominal recitations of structure in an otherwise
174
ineligible method fail to make the method a statutory process."'
Because the method claimed did not include a particular machine or
transform subject matter from one state to another, the BPAI rejected
the appeal stating "[a] statutory "process" must meet one of those two
requirements."' 17 Perhaps most importantly, the BPAI held that the
claims had no "practical application except in connection with a digital
computer."' 176 The BPAI reasoned that recitation of a general-purpose
computer does not render an unpatentable method patentable.' 77 Taken
to its most literal reading, Langemyr stands for the proposition that
recitation 78
of a general-purpose computer does not qualify as a particular
1
machine.
Next, in Ex parte Wasynczuk, the BPAI issued another informative
opinion on June 2, 2008.179 The claims in Wasynczuk concerned a
computer implemented physical modeling process that included a claim
180
for carrying out the process in a distributed computer network.
Claims 9-13, 16-20, 24-26, and 34-38 were held to be patentable as they
qualified as a process and were not a patentable idea. 181 The BPAI
strictly held to the machine-or-transformation test as the clue to
patentability. 182 While the claims did not transform an article to a
different state, because the claims "recite a process that employs one of
the other statutory categories," it was patentable. 183 Interestingly,
170. Ex parte Langemyr, Appeal No. 2008-1495 (May 28, 2008), http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd081495.pdf.
171. Id.at2.
172. Id.
173. Id.at 19.
174. Id.at20.
175. Id.at 19.
176. Id.at 23-24.
177. Id.at24.
178. Id.

179. Ex parte Wasynczuk, Appeal No. 2008-1496 (June 2, 2008), http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd081496.pdf.
180. Id.at2.
181. Id.at 7.
182. Id.at 13.
183. Id.at22.
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because two computing devices were described as an embodiment in the4
specification, the BPAI held that a particular apparatus was disclosed.1
Evidently the difference between Langemyr and Wasynczuk is the
difference in the terms "computer apparatus" and "physical computing
device."
However, in Wasynczuk, claims 1-8, 29, 31, and 32 were rejected
under section 101.18 Unlike in claim 9, the BPAI could not find a
particular machine in claim 1 and because the method was a pure
mathematical representation of a physical system, it did not disclose
statutory subject matter.18 6 The BPAI held that the "computerimplemented system" described in claim 1 was simply 88a general87
purpose computer, and thus,' the claim was not patentable.
It was with these cases in mind that In re Bilski was decided. Bilski
involved a business method patent that disclosed a method for hedging
risk in a transaction. 189 The method involved transactions specific to
commodities trading,' 90 and the claims' 9' 192disclosed transactions
involving both actual commodities and options.
The examiner rejected the claims because the invention was "not
implemented on a specific apparatus and merely manipulate[d] [an]
abstract idea."' 93 Additionally, the examiner determined that the claims
only solved "a purely mathematical problem without any limitation to a

184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 25.
Id.

188. Id. at 26.
189. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
190. Id.

191. Claim 1 of the application reads as follows:
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by
a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and
consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate
corresponding to a risk position of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk
position to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and
said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market
participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer
transactions
Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 950.
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practical application" thereby causing the invention to not be "directed
to the technological arts."'1 9 4 The crux of the examiner's argument was
that the invention was not limited to a "specific apparatus." ' "5
The BPAI overruled the examiner stating the examiner had relied on
an unsupported "technological arts" test. 9 6-The BPAI also determined
that the "specific apparatus" requirement mandated by the examiner
ignored the possibility of patentability through the "transformation of
physical subject matter from one state to another."' 97 Regardless, the
BPAI concluded that the claims did not involve a transformation that
was patent eligible. 198 Transformation of financial risks and legal
obligations does not qualify as patent-eligible subject matter under the
machine-or-transformation test. 99 Because the claims cover every
possible way of performing the process, including by human, machine,
or a combination of the two, the BPAI concluded the claims were
nothing more than an abstract idea. 20 0 Going further, the BPAI held that
the product of the process was not a "useful, concrete, and tangible
result" and, therefore,
could not clear even the lowest of hurdles for
20 1
patentability.
The CAFC granted the appeal and faced the question of what the
appropriate test for patentable202subject matter was for determining
whether a process is patentable. First, the CAFC traced the history of
the test for patentability, citing2 Diehr, Benson, and Flook as the
foundation for the current test. 03 The CAFC determined that the
SCOTUS had "enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a
process claim is tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a
particular application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt
the principle itself., 20 4 This definitive test was of course, the machineor-transformation test from Benson that the "clue to the patentability of
a process claim that does not include particular machines" is
"[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or
thing.' 20 5 In order to prevent clever claims draftsman from skirting the
requirements, the CAFC stated that this particular machine or

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 952.
Id. at 954-55.
Id. at 954.
Id.at 955-66 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70).
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transformation must not constitute mere "insignificant postsolution
activity.2°6
Second, the CAFC addressed the viability of the other articulated
statutory subject matter tests. It concluded that the Freeman-WalterAbele test was inadequate in light of the fact that "a claim failing that
test may nonetheless be patent-eligible. 2 °8 The second test the CAFC
addressed was the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test associated
with State Street.20 9 The basis for the test is not inconsistent with the
outcome of the machine-or-transformation test. Namely, if a process is
tied to a specific machine, or transforms an article into a different state,
generally the product is concrete or tangible, at least according to the
CAFC. 210 Yet, the CAFC indicated that this test was also "insufficient
to determine whether a claim is patent-eligible." 211 Additionally, the
CAFC addressed the "technological arts test" and quickly disposed of it
as "no such test has ever been explicitly adopted by" the SCOTUS or
any other court.212 Similarly, the CAFC rejected any exceptions to
section 101 other than those clearly spelled out by the SCOTUS. 213
The test left standing was the machine-or-transformation test.
It
215
involves a two-pronged inquiry.
If an applicant shows the claim is
either tied to a "particular machine" or the claim "transforms an article,"
then the claim discloses patentable subject matter.216 Unfortunately, the
CAFC declined to articulate how an applicant might meet the
"particular machine" standard.2 17 The CAFC did speak as to what might
qualify as a "transformation" under the test. 218 The standard is easy for
chemical or mechanical raw materials, but not so easy for the raw
materials of the information age. 219 The danger with information lies in
the fact that it is possible to claim a fundamental principle and therefore,
pre-empt its use. The CAFC suggested that a transformation occurred
as long as
206. Id. at 957 (quoting Diehr,450 U.S. at 192).
207. Id.at 958.
208. Id. at 959.
209. Id.
210. Id. Though this remains to be seen, not all processes produce a concrete or tangible
result, thus the reason "useful" was included.
211. Id.at 959.
212. Id. at 960.
213. Id.
214. Id.at 961.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 962. The CAFC declined to articulate a cognizant standard for what constitutes a
"particular machine" because no such machine was present in the Applicants' claims. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 963.
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the claimed process is limited to a practical application of a
fundamental principle to transform specific data, and the claim is
limited to a visual depiction that represents specific physical
objects or substances, there is no danger that the scope
of the
22
claim would wholly pre-empt all uses of the principle. 1
Again, the CAFC was aware of clever draftsman and indicated that a
simple "data-gathering" step was not sufficient to qualify as a
transformation. 22 If there is indication of steps taken223to obtain data and
what the data represents, it is likely a transformation.
With the question of which test controls patentability of processes
resolved, the CAFC turned to the invention in question. 224 Because no
"particular machine" was recited, the only question left to address was
whether there was a qualifying "transformation" under the machine-ortransformation test. 2 5 The CAFC held that manipulation of legal
obligations or business risks "cannot meet the test because they are not
physical objects or substances" nor are they representations of such
objects or substances. 22 6 The claims in Bilski merely described the
exchange of legal rights or options. 227 So, under the machine-ortransformation test, the claims were directed to nothing more than
mental processes or abstract concepts and not the transformation of
"any physical object or substance, or an electronic signal representative
of any physical object or substance. 228 Accordingly, the CAFC
affirmed the rejection of the claims as patentable subject matter. 229
Not surprisingly, three judges dissented from the opinion. 230 Judge
Mayer dissented because he felt that there was no constitutional
protection for business methods. 231 He recognized that the machine-ortransformation test did little to stop the growth of business method
patents. 232 One could arguably find a transformation described by the
claims in Bilski.233 This just illustrates that the machine-or221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.

224. Id.
225. Id. at 962, 963.
226. Id. at 963.
227. Id. at 964.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 966. Of course, it did so without any instruction on whether computer software
or business methods qualified as statutory subject matter. Instead, it left a test with nebulous
applicability.
230. This was not surprising because this was a major retreat from prior CAFC precedent.
See Stefania Fusco, Is In re Bilski a Dejti Vu?, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REv. P1, at 5-7 (2009).

231. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1008.
233. Id. at 1008-09.
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transformation test only has as much power as those who desire to wield
it. Judge Mayer's reticence lay in granting a patent to fields in "liberalas opposed to technological-arts."
Judge Rader succinctly dissented by stating that "[b]ecause Bilski
2 35
claims merely an abstract idea" the CAFC should affirm the rejection.
His concern lay with the fact that these tests were generated from an
"industrial age decades removed from the bleeding edge." 236 He
questioned why section 101 should be read to limit an invention "simply
because it is not transformational or properly linked to a machine
(whatever that means)., 237 He suggested adhering to the standard set
forth by the SCOTUS: that the only limits to patentability are "natural
laws, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." 238 Lastly, Judge Rader
recognized that the test advanced by the CAFC only
prompts more
2 39
questions and throws the software industry into a flux.
Judge Newman also issued a scathing dissent and argued that the
majority imposed "new and far-reaching" restrictions of the types of
inventions that are eligible for patent protection. 24 Judge Newman
traced the definition of the term "process" and reiterated that nowhere in
section 100(b) or section 101 is the term restricted to situations where it
is linked to a particular machine or transformation. 241 Additionally, she
analyzed the history of Benson and came to the conclusion that it was
not intended to be the be-all-end-all of patentability tests. 242 Key
language in Benson indicated that the Court did not "hold that no
process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet" the test and that the
243
Court's intent was not to limit or in any way stifle future technology.
The SCOTUS routinely adopted a broad reading of section 101 in such
cases as Flook and Chakrabarty.244 This concept
was further reinforced
245
by subsequent SCOTUS authority in Diehr.
As stated by Judge Newman, "Congress plainly contemplated that
the patent laws would be given wide scope."
In light of that fact, a
234. Id. at 1011.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1012.
238. Id. As for what exactly an "abstract idea" is, Judge Rader suggests that an abstract
idea "must be applied to (transformed into) a practical use before it qualifies for protection." Id.
at 1013.
239. Id.at 1015.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 978.
Id. at 979.
Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)).
Id. at 980 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at981-82.
Id. at 983 (quoting J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S.
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process has always been "a distinct category of patentable invention,
and not tied to either apparatus or transformation. 247 So, while patents
from a different era reflect the dominant industries of that time, namely
chemical and mechanical technology, "modem processes reflect the
dramatic advances in telecommunications and computing., 248 Judge
Newman felt that "[r]eplacement of paper with a computer screen, and
pencil with electrons does not 'untie' the process." 249 Disregarding the
useful, concrete, and tangible result test ignores that it250was far more
useful in cases of modem technology than any other test.
Furthermore, better mechanisms exist to determine whether claims
such as those under scrutiny in Bilski are patentable. 25 1 For instance, the
invention must still be novel and non-obvious and must still meet the
requirements set forth in section 112, namely enablement, description,
and specificity. 252 If in fact a claim is too broad, the proper rejection
would come under section 112, and any proper limitations should be
added during prosecution. 2 53 Additionally, it might be so broad that it
reads on prior art, but to Judge Newman, it was improper
4 to use section
101 as a rejection as the claims were not abstractions.254
The Bilski decision addressed a misunderstanding 255 in the decision
of the CAFC in In re Comiskey.256 Some felt that the ruling in Comiskey
added another test, or requirement for physical steps when reciting a
mental process. 257 In 2009, the CAFC vacated that ruling and issued a
new opinion.258 The new opinion rejected the claims at issue due to lack
of statutory subject matter.25 The claims at issue involved a system and
method for arbitration involving legal documents. 260 The PTO rejected
the claims based upon prior art. 61 The CAFC did "not reach the ground
relied on by the Board below" and instead rejected the claims because

124, 130
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

(2001)).
Id.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 990.
Id. at 991-92.
Id. at 995.

252. Id.
253. Id.at 996. Judge Newman, herself a former patent attorney, reflects that it is routine to
have a broad first claim and that these broad claims do not contribute to any crisis the CAFC
perceives it faces. Id.
254. Id. at 997.

255. Id. at 960 (majority opinion).
256. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
257. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960.

258. Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 969.
259. Id.at 969-70.

260. Id. at 970.
261.

Id. at 972.
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they did not read to statutory subject matter.262 Though statutory subject
matter was designed to be broad, the SCOTUS has consistently rejected
a literal reading of the term process. 2 63 Instead, whether a process is
patentable falls to the question of whether the process falls into one of
the categories specifically excluded by the SCOTUS. 2 64 This includes
the prohibition of patenting abstract ideas. 26 5 Even though an abstract
idea might be patentable if tied a particular machine or creates a
transformation, a pure mental process is not patentable. 266 Therefore, a
claim, such as those in Comiskey that are simply abstract ideas, are not
patentable. 267 The new Comiskey opinion served as a clear indication
that the CAFC had returned to the machine-or-transformation test.
Similarly, in the case of In re Ferguson,268 the CAFC ruled that the
269
Bilski decision was dispositive in disposing of the Applicant's claims.
The claims involved were directed to a "method of marketing a
product" and a "paradigm for marketing software.' 270 Again, post
Bilski, these claims are not patentable as they do not meet either prong
of the machine-or-transformation test. 27 1 The thing that makes Ferguson
interesting was that the Applicant 272 advanced a new test for
patentability. 273 The new test asked whether there was "more than a
scintilla of interaction with the real world in a specific way" between
the product or process claimed.274 The CAFC questioned whether this
test would allow even the most abstract concepts to become
patentable. 275 Not surprisingly, the CAFC declined to apply the new test
further solidifying that the machine-or-transformation
test was the sole
276
path for patentability of a process.

262. Id. at 973.
263. Id.at 977.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 978-79.
267. Id. at 981.
268. In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
269. Id. at 1363.
270. Id. at 1361.
271. Id. at 1365.
272. In this case, the Applicant turned out to be Scott Harris, a patent attorney and inventor
formerly of Fish & Richardson. See Patenly-O.com, In re Ferguson: Patentable Subject Matter,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/in-re-ferguson-patentable-subject-matter.html
(last
visited May 07, 2009).
273. Ferguson, 558 F.3d at 1364.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1365. Ironically enough, the CAFC also stated that application of the test would
lead to "ambiguity," though, as previously shown, there is still plenty of that to go around.
276. Id.
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After Bilski, the PTO released a Memorandum entitled "Guidance
for Examining Process Claims in view of In re Bilski."2'77 Issued by
Deputy Commissioner John J. Love, the Memorandum clarified that
examiners should continue to follow the current guidelines for
determining subject matter eligibility in the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP) except for one modification. 278 The
guidelines in MPEP 2106 were modified to include the proper test for a
method claim as being whether the method claim "is (1) tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) transforms a particular article to
a different state or thing." 279 The memo stressed that meaningful limits
must be placed on the scope of the method rather than mere "field-ofuse" limitations or "extra-solution activity." 280 Extra-solution activity
was clarified to mean that "reciting a specific machine or28a particular
transformation of a specific article in an insignificant step." '
With these new guidelines in place, the BPAI strongly adhered to the
282
machine-or-transformation test. For example, in Ex parte Nawathe,
the BPAI utilized the Bilski reasoning to affirm the rejection of claims
that disclosed a method and system for representing normalized
extensible markup language (XML) data structures as tables in a
database.283 The BPAI held that the method was not "tied to a particular
machine for executing the claimed steps" but was simply tied to a
general-purpose computer. 284 Additionally, the XML documents were
not physical articles but simply data that represent entities, so no
285
transformation could occur to change them from one state to another.
Additionally, the BPAI made it absolutely clear that the useful,
concrete, and tangible result test was no longer in use post Bilski.286 It is
clear, then, that the machine-or-transformation test is the controlling test
for subject matter and process claims. But is this really the best test for
burgeoning technologies?

277. Memorandum from John J. Love, Deputy Commissioner for Patnet Examination
Policy, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Guidance for Examining Process Claims in view of
In re Bilski to the Technology Center Directors and Patent Examining Corps of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (Jan. 7, 2009) (on file with author).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.

282. Ex parte Nawathe, Appeal No. 2007-3360 (Feb. 9, 2009), http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/
ReterivePdt~system=BPAI&flNm=fd20073360-02-09-2009-1.
283. Id. at 8-9.
284. Id. at 8.

285. Id.
286. Id. at 9.
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V. A NEW HOPE?
A major concern addressed by Bilski and its ilk is that patents should
not issue for methods that merely computerize or automate an already
known or common method or practice. 287 A second issue is how to
distinguish patents that issue for abstract methods that were not tied to a
specific machine. 28 8 While patent protection was designed to protect
"anything under the sun that is made by man,' '289 it was not designed to
issue for any idea man has had. 290 This affects process claims because
29 1
they are inherently more abstract and need not be tied to a machine.
The CAFC has had trouble coming up with a new test for statutory
subject matter. The time has come for a new test to emerge.
There are three possible interpretations of the machine-ortransformation test as applied to computer software or business
methods. The first is that the machine necessary to bring a computer
program into the statutory subject matter arena is a simple computer.
This idea was rejected.29 The second interpretation is that electronic
impulses satisfy the physicality for which the CAFC is looking. Again,
this was also rejected.293 The third interpretation is that the
transformation contemplated by the test can be satisfied by
transformation of some electronic data. This interpretation does not
seem promising, but still, while a transformation does occur it is
incidental to the act that would be subject to patent protection. Any time
a computer is switched on, a program loaded, or data saved, some
physical transformation occurs.
The problem is, where one patent might simply describe electricity,
another might describe a new method of harnessing electricity. A
mechanism must exist to distinguish the two. The root idea must be
analyzed. Subject matter was designed to be expansive. 294 Therefore,
the core problem seems to be that while it is understood abstract ideas
or building blocks cannot be patented, the application of them could.295
But, textualism is prevailing. This means that no leeway is given to
287. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
288. Id.at 1002.
289. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
290. See Thomas, supra note 58, at 202.
291. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 979 (Newman, J., dissenting).
292. See, e.g., Ex Parte Langemyr, Appeal No. 2008-1495 (May 28, 2008), at 24,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/ fd081495.pdf.
293. Id.
294. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 978 (Newman, J., dissenting).
295. Id.at 981.
296. Patently-O.comn, In re Nuijten: Patentable Subject Matter, Textualism, and the
Supreme Court, http://www.patentlyo.com/ patent/2007/02/inrenuijtenp.html (last visited
May 7, 2009).
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the words "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,"
especially the term "process." So, decisions such as Bilski come forward
with complex tests to determine whether there is some sort of
transformation or some physical machine.297
Courts trying to limit subject matter based on physicality ignore the
fact that many ideas today involve a new idea and practical application
but not the traditional physical embodiment. This was once a society
that revolved around industry; 298 this is changing (as the entire world is)
to reflect the computer age and so too should the patent laws. 2 99 Trying
to limit a process claim based on physicality of the outcome effectively
eliminates the statutory subject matter termed "process."300 Bad patents
will be taken care of through sections 102, 103, and 112, or through the
reexamination process. 30 1 This is evidenced through the success of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation's Patent Busting Project at getting
reexaminations granted for various patents the patent community finds
troubling.30 2 Additionally, cases exist that give courts the ability to
invalidate these bad patents.30 3
This Note advocates for patentability of processes as such. But,
because courts seem to love breaking concrete concepts into abstract
tests, this Note will follow suit. The problems associated with previous
tests lied in the fact that without tying the idea to a concrete "machine,"
297. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting).
298. See id.
at 1012. The United States was driven by industry in the 50s and 60s when the
biggest changes to the Patent Act occurred. We cannot strictly read a statute like the Patent Act
to only provide protection for inventions as they would exist in the 50s. We must allow for the
possibility that there is some sort of technology that will be invented that will shape the way we
live in the future. This is what happened with computers and we have seen courts struggle with
applying old rules to these new technologies.
299. See id. at 990 (Newman, J., dissenting).
300. A process is a simple thing to define. Miriam-Webster defines a process in many
ways, one of which is "a series of actions or operations conducting to an end; especially: a
continuous operation or treatment especially in manufacture." Merriam-Webster Online,
definition of process, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/process. Nothing in the
everyday definition requires any physical transformation or other additional step. This is what
the "abstract" terminology used throughout subject matter jurisprudence means. Creating a test
to determine whether something is a process by restricting what a process is. Section 101
requires it to be (among other things) a process in order to qualify as statutory subject matter,
and that is all.
301. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae of Twenty-two Law and Business Professors in
Support of Appellants at 25-30, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008) (No. 2007-1130); Bilski, 545
F.3d at 995 (Newman, J., dissenting).
302. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has a project aimed at "[b]usting" bogus software
patents, termed the "Patent Busting Project." EFF.org, Patent Busting Project, http://w2.eff.
org/patent/ (last visited May 7, 2009). The EFF, with help from outside volunteers, collects prior
art to use in re-examination processes on those patents the EFF deems the "worst offenders."
EFF.org, Patent Busting Project, http://w2.eff.org/patent/wp.php (last visited May 7, 2009).
303. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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a patent could issue on the idea itself. If tied to a machine, the machine
was a necessary part of the invention and the idea could be used with
other "machines."
It provides a supposed necessary limit on patent
3 04
protection.
Consistent with the intent of Congress, the proposed test has a low
threshold for patentability. 30 5 There is no requirement for a particular
machine or physical transformation. These abstract concepts, while
serving a noble purpose, are maddening in their application. Section
100(b) of the Patent Act and the definition of process exemplify how
low the threshold is: "[t]he term 'process' means process, art or method,
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material. 30 6 Therefore, the proposed test is
short, simple, and to the point. After all this test is for a threshold
matter, patentability is addressed by the wonderful mechanisms already
located in title 35: sections 102, 103, and 112.
The new test asks three questions. The first question is whether the
claim is anything more than a description or automation of a law of
nature or natural phenomena. These areas are two of the only areas
specifically excluded by the SCOTUS.3 °7 It should be noted that the
term "abstract" was omitted.30 8 These abstractions are better covered in
section 112, paragraph 6 of title 35. These areas cannot be patented
because they already exist and are not the product of human ingenuity.
It is therefore obvious why this is the first question of the test.
Next, the question is whether there is a practical application of the
process. A practical application requirement should alleviate the issues
many have with the patenting of ethereal concepts. It should be noted
that a practical application does not require tangible output.
Manipulation of data or electrons is certainly practical. For example,
determining a more efficient way to perform a financial task is practical.
This test prevents the financial task itself from being patentable subject
matter, but the more efficient process deserves protection.
The last question is whether the result of the process is expected and
set forth in the patent application. In order to qualify, the process must
produce a predictable result through successive steps. A common
30 9
misunderstanding is that algorithms are in some respect, abstract.
This cannot be further from the truth, especially in the context of
computer programs. An algorithm is designed to produce a desired
304. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.
305. See id. at 978 (Newman, J., dissenting).
306. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2007).
307. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1012 (Rader, J., dissenting).
308. Id.
309. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Twenty-two Law and Business Professors in Support
of Appellants at 5-6, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008) (No. 2007-1130).
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result to solve a specific problem. If it does so in a unique way that
fulfills the other requirements of patentability then it should be
patentable. But, as subject matter, it is enough that the process produces
a desired result. There is no need to go any further as any other
decisions are better left to sections 102, 103, and 112. Additionally, the
test looks at the claim as a whole, not one or two "mechanical" steps.
Furthermore, this definition of process would place the United States
in line with views from such places as the United Kingdom. A recent
appellate decision in the United Kingdom, Symbian Limited v.
Comptroller General of Patents, held that if a computer program made
"technical contribution" with regard to what was eventually achieved, it
was patentable.3 1 0 This means that computer programs "as such" are
now patentable. 311 This new test would harmonize the U.S. PTO more
closely with that of the United Kingdom. Harmonization is desirable in
today's economy because it provides peace of mind to businesses that
conduct themselves internationally.
An example is likely beneficial and instructive. The first, and
broadest, 312 claim from the patent application in Bilski describes:
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a
commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price
comprising the steps of:
initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said
consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon
historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk
position of said consumer;
identifying market participants for said commodity having a
counter-risk position to said consumers; and
initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate

310. Symbian Ltd. v. Comptroller Gen. of Patents, [2008] EWHC 518 (Pat) (U.K.). Of
course, the UK Patent Office does not issue patents for "a way of performing a mental act,
playing a game, or doing business." Requirements for patent protection, United Kingdom
Intellectual Property Office, available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/patentlp-applying/pbefore/p-requirements.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
311. See Paul Cole, Patentability of Computer Software As Such, 2008 PATENTLY-O
PATENT L.J. 1, 1 (2008).

312. It is common practice in patent drafting to create an incredibly broad first claim. See
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 996 (Newman, J.,
dissenting). Because the claims define the boundaries of
the patent, drafters typically use a broad independent claim 1 and begin to limit it using
dependent claims. It is therefore no surprise that Bilski's patent application contains an
overbroad claim 1.

2009] PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND BUSINESS METHODS POST BILSKI: A NEW HOPE

207

such that said series of market participant transactions balances
31 3
the risk position of said series of consumer transactions.
The first question in the new test asks whether the claim is anything
more than a description or automation of a law of nature or natural
phenomena. Nothing about this process is a natural or mathematical
law, or phenomena. It is a man-made process and the new test does not
distinguish between a process that acts upon chemicals and one that acts
upon a business. Therefore, the claim passes the first prong of the new
test. One of the benefits of not asking whether there is an abstract
concept involved is that there is no nebulous test to determine what
qualifies as an abstract concept (the test of which is generally an
abstract concept in and of itself).
The second question in the new test is whether there is a practical
application for the process. There definitely is, managing risk is an
important and desirable goal to achieve. Importantly, this prong does
not require a return to questioning the moral applicability of the claims.
A practicality requirement eliminates patents that issue but are
worthless in the real world. It also provides a necessary check on
whether the invention indeed adds to the advancement of technology, or
exists just to perform boundary testing.
Last, the question of whether an expected result is produced must be
answered. Again, though vague, an expected result is produced. So,
under the new test, the Bilski claim describes patentable subject matter.
Again, the question is not whether the described invention is patentable,
but whether the application describes patentable subject matter. This is a
low threshold for good reason. It is highly probable that this particular
claim would not pass muster under one of the additional hurdles all
patent applications must clear. 314 But, these mechanisms are surely
more than capable of eliminating undesirable and harmful 315 patents
from issuing.
To conclude, the proposed test consists of three steps. Does the
claim describe nothing more than a law of nature or natural phenomena?
Is there a practical use for the process? Does it produce a predicted
result? If all three questions are answered in the affirmative then the
application successfully describes statutory subject matter. No special
"machine or transformation" test should be necessary, especially one
that requires a "particular machine" to be something more than a

313. Id. at 949.
314. In all likelihood, this would not pass muster under §§ 103 or 112 of the Patent Act as
it seems to describe a method in place in the business community for years.
315. Harmful in the sense that they act more to block ingenuity than to facilitate ingenuity
and advancement of the technological arts.
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general-purpose computer. The phrase "process" appears in the Patent
Act for a reason and courts should not try to limit in ways that Congress
never intended.
VI. CONCLUSION

The goal of patent law is to promote ingenuity and advance
technology. 316 Today's world is far different than that of the Industrial
Revolution. Our patent laws should reflect this fact. Tests should not be
based on concepts that live in the past. What was pen and paper is now
keyboard and screen. Court decisions and PTO rules need to reflect this
reality. Computers now drive innovation.
Patent applications reflect this
317
fact.
this
reflect
fact. Businesses
No doubt, there have been issues with patents that the community on
the whole deems obvious or baseline in the industry. 318 But, the PTO
should not try to use section 101 to invalidate those patent applications
that seem "fishy." There are mechanisms already built into the Patent
Act to deal with such patents.3 19 This much is clear,320
computer software
and business methods are patentable subject matter. Companies have
relied on this fact and built around valuable patent portfolios and this
fact should not be ignored.32 1
The new test advocated by this Note is simple. It derives each step
from well-settled principles. If a "questionable" patent application were
to make its way past the new test, it just means that the application
describes a process, not that this process is in fact patentable. The new
test recognizes that section 101 should not overstep its bounds and make
decisions other areas of the Patent Act are better equipped to perform.
This ensures that living in the past does not stifle future ingenuity. As
Judge Rader said best in his dissent from Bilski,322 "[w]e still do not
know2 3 one thousandth of one percent of what nature has revealed to
3

us."

316. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting).
317. For example, companies such as Microsoft, AT&T, and Google are among the
world's most valuable companies. See Saul Hansell, Bye Bye Pampers: Google is Fifth Most
Valuable Company, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/3 1/byebye-pampers-google-is-fifth-most-valuable-company/.
318. Justice Mayer's dissent in Bilski illustrates many questionable patents the CAFC has
been asked to review. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 100 1-02 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
319. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (2007).
320. For instance, business method patents are explicitly mentioned in 35 U.S.C. §
273(a)(3) (2007).
321. See text accompanying note 314. See also Duffy, supra note 10, at 2.
322. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015. (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
323. Id. Attributed to Albert Einstein. Id.

